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Anxieties about the performance of superannuation funds and concerns about the safety 
of superannuation entitlements poses the question of what individual contributors can do 
to ensure their entitlements are secure.  One difficulty for contributors is that they have 
little control over decisions relating to their superannuation fund; as these decisions are 
made by their agents over whom they have little effective influence.  Principal and agent 
problems abound in superannuation and, in this paper, we explore the nature and extent 
of these problems as well as possible solutions.  The nature of the principal and agent 
problems are more severe in defined contribution or accumulation funds, ACFs, by far 
the most common type of superannuation scheme in Australia.  In these funds decisions 
are made by trustees who are the legal owners of the assets of the fund, but are required 
to act in the interests of the beneficiaries.  Major decisions about portfolio composition 
determine the  gross returns to the fund while other decisions relating to costs affect the 
net return to the fund and ultimately to the members. 
 
There appears to have been little initial consideration given to the design of 
superannuation schemes when the new regime was introduced and there are no coherent 
design principles to guide expansion of the system - even though employees bear the 
investment risk entirely and have limited opportunities to be involved in decisions about 
that risk.
1  Against this backdrop, principal and agent, adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems are examined forthwith in a climate of long-run uncertainty in investment and 
asymmetric information.  With these issues considered, policy recommendations to 
reduce principal and agent problems are made. 
 
                                                 
1 The consultancy firm Noble Lowndes (1986) list the areas where no initial guidance was given in relation 
to award superannuation, finding that “the total lack of detailed consultation, the unprecedented period 
for implementation and the failure to publish in advance the regulations covering administration, 
combine together to ensure that funds set up or varied to comply with any award are likely to be 
divergent in type, detail and administrative complexity. This will militate against one of the stated 





2. Superannuation Funds in Australia – An Overview 
 
We take it that the goal of a member of an accumulation fund is to maximise the 
accumulated benefits at the date of retirement in order to purchase the highest value 
annuity or pension.  This goal is achieved by gaining the highest crediting rate (i.e., the 
highest net returns) consistent with a given degree of risk.  Most members of 
superannuation funds belong to ACFs as shown in the table below. Membership of ACFs 
is dominant in the private sector, which has the great majority of superannuation 
accounts. 
 
Table 1. Membership of Superannuation Funds, Australia, September 2002 
 
  Accumulation Funds  Defined Benefit Funds  Hybrid Funds 
Per cent in each sector      
Public Sector  29  9  62 
Private Sector  91  1  8 
Per cent of total       
Public Sector  3  1  7 
Private Sector  80  1  8 
Source: Derived from APRA statistics 
 
Table 2. Assets of Superannuation Funds, Australia, September 2002, Per cent of Total 
 
  Accumulation Funds  Defined Benefit Funds  Hybrid Funds 
Public Sector  2  2  22 
Private Sector  58  2  14 
Source: Derived from APRA statistics 
 
3. Principal and Agent Problems 
 
The classic principal agency relationship in one in which the principal engages, through 
an explicit or implicit contract, the agent to take action and make decisions on behalf of 
the principal.  Agency costs are the costs of establishing and enforcing such contracts.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency costs as: 
1.  Monitoring expenditures by principal; 
2.  Bonding expenditures by the agent; and, 
3.  Residual losses borne by the principal. 
 
Monitoring expenditures by the principal are incurred to monitor the agent’s behaviour.  
Bonding expenditures are incurred by the agent to assure the principal that the agent will 
not behave so as to damage the principal or will provide an indemnity to the principal to 
cover losses of certain actions.  These two categories of costs are out-of-pocket costs of 
structuring and administering contracts.  The residual loss is the value of losses incurred 
by the principal from decisions made by the agent which produce results which deviate 
from those resulting from a decision of the principal with the same information and talent 
as the agent.  The principal will find it profitable to incur expenditure in policing the 
contract to the extent that the reduction in the loss from non-compliance is equal to the 
incremental costs of enforcement.  The residual loss is the opportunity cost of 






A principal would engage an agent if the agent has superior knowledge or abilities to the 
principal, but a rational principal would engage an agent who has access to lower 
transactions costs.  In superannuation most principals would prefer an agent to make 
investment decisions (although it must be noted that the ‘DIY’ funds are a fast growing 
segment of the industry; this growth has been attributed to the desire for control on the 
part of principals, Roberts 2001).
2  A principal has also to include in the contract an 
arrangement for remuneration of the agent and a provision for the termination of the 
contract or replacement of the principal.  The agent engages in the contract to obtain 
remuneration and has an incentive to continue in the contractual arrangement.  The 
literature on agency costs distinguishes two types of incentive problems: 
1.  Hidden action; and,  
2.  Hidden information. 
 
Hidden action is a situation where it is prohibitively expensive for the principal to 
observe the agent’s actions implying the existence of a trade-off between performance 
incentives and efficient risk-sharing while hidden information refers to the problem 
where the agent has superior information to the principal. 
 
A contract has to deal with the incentive problems arising from hidden action and hidden 
information.  An agent can profit from concealing the private information unavailable to 
the principal.  Optimal contracts, according to Myerson (1982) and Radnar (1985) and 
can be formulated by linking remuneration to multiple indicators of the agent’s 
performance and by invoking the revelation principle.  A principal can shield the agent 
from unnecessary risk by making the agent’s remuneration at any time a function of 
previous outcomes.  Under the revelation principle, the principal requires the agent to 
report his/her information, I, and commits himself/herself to a pair of functions, f(I) and 
g(I) which specify remuneration for all possible reports.  If an agent finds it in his/her 
best interests to report the actual information, I, in all cases, incentive compatibility 
prevails.  The agent will be willing to enter into, and remain committed to, the contract 
only if his/her pay-off is equivalent to an exogenously determined reservation level.  The 
principal is faced with two classes of problem: 
 
1.  Adverse selection; and, 
2.  Moral hazard. 
 
Adverse selection problems apply at the outset of the contract when the principal has to 
select the agent who possesses superior knowledge, abilities or access.  The principal 
may not have the information to make this selection or may not have the ability.  In the 
case of incomplete information, the principal requires a contract that allows for 
modification of the contract or replacement of the agent.  The second problem, moral 
hazard, exists where the agent does not perform in the best interests of the principal and 
may be able to garner an information rent. 
                                                 
2 ‘DIY’ or do-it-yourself funds are small self managed superannuation funds with fewer than five members 






Agency problems would be minimised under member choice of fund and are ameliorated 
by investment choice.
3, 4  Under the current framework, principal-agent problems are 
compounded by the arrangement where the member’s employer chooses the fund and 
where the trustees of the superannuation fund makes the investment choice.  To examine 
this further we need to consider the structure of superannuation funds and the role of 
trustees. 
 
3. Structure of Superannuation Funds 
 
Superannuation funds operate as a trust structure.  The trustees of the fund are the legal 
owners of the assets of the scheme held in trust for the members of the fund, i.e., the 
beneficiaries.  Trustees receive contributions that are used to acquire a portfolio of assets; 
expenses of the fund are meet from contributions and earnings. 
 
Trustees appoint custodians to hold the assets of the trust in a secure manner.  Trustees 
have common law fiduciary duties in relation to the beneficiaries, i.e., to act honestly, to 
act in the interests of the beneficiaries, and to act prudently. In addition, trustees have 
legislative responsibilities imposed under the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 
1993 (SIS) and the various State Acts regulating trustees powers of investment.
5  The 
States have now adopted the prudent person approach to trustees’ powers of investment 
under which there are no legislative injunctions to hold designated assets but a general 
requirement to behave as a prudent person in making investment decisions.  Stanford 
(2001) provides an analysis of this regime. 
 
The major requirements from the SIS Act are: 
 
1.  Superannuation funds are prohibited from levying and charges exceeding earnings in 
respect of account balances lower than $1000 except when the fund suffers negative 
returns; 
2.  Equal numbers of employer and employee representatives are mandated on trustee 
boards of large employer sponsored funds; 
3.  Sole purpose test requires benefits from superannuation funds to be paid only in 
retirement benefits or in death benefits to contributors who die before retirement; 
4.  Membership reporting rules require regular reporting to members; 
5.  APRA is required to approve trustees for public offer superannuation funds; 
6.  Lodgment of audited annual reports by superannuation funds is mandated; 
7.  There are investment restrictions on borrowing and on lending to members; 
8.  Preservation of  benefits is required and balances are not to be paid to contributors 
until they reach the age of 55 years; 
                                                 
3 Legislation to introduce member choice of fund is still before the Senate having passed in the House of 
Representatives. 
4 Members are not offered a complete range of options under investment choice and are not offered a 






9.  Compulsory payment of benefits out of the superannuation fund is required when 
members reaches a specified age which is now 65 years. 
 
Superannuation funds are required to have an investment strategy which allocates 
contributions to asset classes and which selects individual securities within the asset 
classes.  Trustees have to make a number of decisions - the major ones are about 
composition of the portfolio which is usually referred to as the ‘asset allocation’ decision 
and it is common for trustees to engage the services of an asset consultant to advise on 
this.  Once the asset allocation decision has been made trustees appoint funds managers 
to acquire assets in implementation of the asset allocation policy.  Trustees monitor the 
performance of funds managers and may replace them.  
 
Superannuation funds are subject to regulation by three bodies: the Australian Taxation 
Office, ATO, which is responsible for seeing employers and funds comply with the 
Superannuation Guarantee Charge and for the regulation of self managed funds with 
fewer than five members; the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, APRA, is the 
regulator of most funds and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission, ASIC, 
which has consumer protection responsibilities.  The demarcation between the roles of 
APRA and ASIC is imperfectly delineated and the consumer protection duties have been 
carried out in a perfunctory manner. 
 
Trustees must also determine whether they will directly invest the funds or will hire 
outside managers to do so under a specific mandate.  About 65 per cent of 
superannuation assets are managed by external managers or through the funds of life 
offices.  Trustees select external managers and commit them to a ‘mandate’, i.e., specific 
instructions as to the value of assets and the style of management.  Trustees usually set a 
‘benchmark’ rate of return for managers to achieve.  
 
In general there are no formal requirements for appointment as a trustee; there are some 
grounds on which a person may be disqualified as a trustee.  Just who can be a trustee 
depends on the type of accumulation fund.  The regulatory authorities classify 
accumulation superannuation funds in the following categories: 
 
1.  Corporate funds which are sponsored by a single non-government employer or group 
of employers;  
2.  Public sector funds which are sponsored by government employers or by government 
business enterprises;  
3.  Industry funds which are established under an award or agreement; and, 
4.  Retail funds which are pooled super products marketed by intermediaries to the 
general public; they include master trusts and personal superannuation products 
offered by life insurance companies and other financial institutions. 
 
The majority of superannuation accounts are held in retail superannuation funds, 
accounting for one-third of total assets.  Further details are shown in the table below. 
 






Type of Funds  Assets  Members 
Corporate 12  6 
Industry 10  30 
Public Sector  20  12 
Retail 33  51 
Other 25  2 
Source: Derived from APRA statistics; Note: ‘DIY’ funds are included in ‘Other’. 
 
Corporate funds must have equal representation of employers and employees as trustees 
or equal representation on the board of a corporate trustee; similarly, employers and 
employees are represented as trustees of industry funds.  Trustees representing employees 
may be appointed by a trade union or as a result of some form of election.  In a public 
sector fund, an equal number of employer and employee trustees and an independent 
chairman are appointed by the Minister.  Two points can be noted: first, employers 
typically select the superannuation fund and some of the trustees of the fund; second, 
trade unions have a marked role in superannuation funds through their administration of 
industry funds and their other role in providing ‘employee representatives’ or the 
mechanisms to select such representatives. 
 
Retail funds are a special case and quite different in structure to the other types of funds; 
retail funds are operated by financial institutions as for-profit organisations.  Retail funds 
have a subsidiary company of the financial institution as a corporate trustee and another 
as the funds manager; the executives of the trustee company and the funds manager 
company are employees of the financial institution operating the retail superannuation 
fund.  There is no provision for employee representation on the trustees but larger funds 
may have a ‘policy committee’ comprised of employee and employer representative to 
give advice to the trustees. 
 
Scheiwe and Stirling (1999) argue that the current system leaves members of 
superannuation funds subject to risk of fraud, misappropriation and bad management 
practices and that consumer protection provisions are inadequate.  Given that employees 
bear the full investment risk in ACFs, it is entirely reasonable that employees have 
greater choice of trustees.  The inclusion of employer representatives on the board of 
trustees is, as Scheiwe and Stirling (1999) argue, a hangover from the past.  It may be 
appropriate for employers to have a major influence on decisions in a DBF but employers 
have no legitimate interest in the outcomes of an ACF; employers have a legal 
responsibility to pay mandated contributions to a complying fund in a similar manner to 
remitting PAYE taxation deductions to the Australian Taxation Office.  The 
superannuation fund receives the contributions paid on behalf of members by employers 
and the trustees (whose duties are described in detail below) has to make a number of 
choices the more important of which are: 
1.  Asset allocation; and, 
2.  Asset selection. 
 
The asset allocation decision is to determine the proportion of the fund’s total assets to 





below are those identified by the regulator in Australia.  Usually, as indicated previously,  
trustees employ external consultants to advise on this decision.  Trustees are not required 
to have particular financial skills and may genuinely need advice; in addition, trustees use 
external consultants to show that they are behaving prudently. 
 
In the aggregate, superannuation funds allocate about 45 per cent of total assets to 
domestic equities and a further 19 per cent to overseas assets, principally equities.  This 
allocation reflects the belief that there is an ‘equity premium’, i.e., a long-term historical 
excess return on equities over bonds (Asness 2000).  While this may be a defensible 
strategy over the long run, assuming previous historical experience will be repeated, in 
times of falling equity prices, the current value of superannuation entitlements will be 
reduced through this strategy. 
 
Asset selection decisions involve choice of individual securities or assets within each 
broad asset class.  The fundamental choice in asset selection is between active 
management and passive management of the portfolio.  Under active management the 
portfolio manager selects individual securities engages in frequent trading of assets in an 
attempt to out-perform the benchmark.  Under passive management, funds managers do 
not attempt to pick individual securities but select assets by reference to a formula and 
hold these assets with very infrequent trading.  For instance, a passive domestic equity 
portfolio would attempt to replicate the composition of an equities benchmark such as the 
S&P/ASX 200 index.  The virtues of asset and passive management have been 
intensively debated in the literature.  The major analytical proposition is the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis (EMH) (contributed by Fama 1970) which postulates that securities 
markets are informationally efficient so that it is not profitable to trade on the available 
set of information.  The EMH predicts that active managers will not be able to earn 
excess returns on a consistent basis.  The recommendation of the EMH is to pursue a 
passive buy and hold strategy, i.e., buy index funds as this strategy over the long term 
will produce superior returns. 
 
Many of the empirical studies on this question have been concerned with US mutual 
funds; Jensen (1968), Malkiel (1995) and Gruber (1996) find that the mutual fund 
management industry destroys value through under-performance of benchmark returns.  
Recent Australian studies of managers specialising in domestic equities in retail 
superannuation funds, Drew and Noland (2000), Drew and Stanford (2001a, 2001b, 
2003), and Drew, Stanford and Veeraraghavan (2002) corroborate the US experience.  
Drew and Stanford (2002) further argue that a passive strategy should be the default 






4. Principal and Agent Relations in Superannuation Funds 
 
The major principal and agent relations in superannuation funds are summarised below:
6 
 
Table 4. Summary of Principal and Agent Problems in Superannuation, Australia. 
 
  Principal  Agent  Action  Contract and Remuneration 
1 Member 
(SC) 
Employer Selects  fund; 
selects trustee 





Selects fund and 
allows union to 
operate fund 
•  None possible. 
3 Member    Trustee  Runs  fund 
incurs costs 
selects portfolio 
•  Trustee determines own remuneration 
and trust expenses; 
•  Cannot be removed by members 
•  May be removed by regulator under 
extreme conditions; and, 
•  Is not explicitly required to disclose 
remuneration and expenses in detail to 
members. 
4 Trustee Asset 
Consultant 
Advises on portfolio 
selection and asset 
allocation 
•  Contract allows for removal by trustee; 
and, 
•  Remunerated by fee as percentage of 
assets under management. 
5 Trustee Funds 
Manager 
Implements portfolio 
and asset selection 
•  Contract allows for removal by trustee; 
and, 
•  Remunerated by fee as percentage of 
assets under management. 
 
In the first principal and agent relation, under the Superannuation Guarantee provisions, 
the member’s agent in selecting a fund and some of the trustees is the employer who is 
not subject to direction or influence by the member.  The usual channel for influence 
would be through industrial arrangements but we hypothesise that this channel is likely to 
be ineffectual as the SG is a legislative requirement and not a part of enterprise 
bargaining and as trade union officials would prefer to channel SG contributions to the 
industry fund established to receive award contributions.  Paternalism on the part of 
employers is exhibited in the establishment of corporate superannuation funds; such 
funds account for a small minority of all funds.  Similarly the member is unable to 
influence the choice of fund given the history of award superannuation.  In both cases, 
the choice of funds and trustees is a fait accompli for employees and it is not worth their 
incurring monitoring costs nor is it worth while for employers or the industrial tribunal to 
incur bonding expenditures with the employees.
7  In the third relation, members are 
                                                 
6 Only relationships in compulsory superannuation arrangements are considered.  Some contributions to 
superannuation funds are voluntary and contributors may rely on advice from financial planners.  The 
competence and integrity of financial planners is less than satisfactory, ASIC (2003). 
7 A number of readers of this paper will be members of the Universities corporate superannuation fund, 
UniSuper, on whose board of trustees is a representative of academic staff.  We ask such readers to sit 
the following pop quiz: (1) can you explain how this position is filled?; and, (2) what role did you play 





unable to remove trustees who are not required to seek members’ view much less act on 
them.  The member plays no role in the determination of trustees’ remuneration or 
expenses and thus has no incentive to incur monitoring costs because the expected 
benefit is zero.  Trustees have no need to bond with members. In the fourth and fifth 
relation, the trustee is in a position to influence the behaviour of the agents and it is 
worthwhile for the agents to incur bonding expenditures.  An important role of both asset 
consultants and fund managers is to be ‘trustee managers’; to influence trustees to accept 
the conventions of the funds management industry.  This is not particularly difficult as 
trustees are generally inexperienced in financial matters and are not confident of their 
abilities to express contrary views.  We argue that the general effect of ‘trustee 
management’ is to: 
 
1.  Increase the costs of the fund; 
2.  Specify investment objectives in terms which are easily obtainable; and, 
3.  Encourage herding. 
 
Apart from the costs of the consultants’ advice, such advice leads to the use of actively 
managed asset selection strategies as it is the conventional belief in the funds 
management industry, contrary to the evidence, that active management can produce 
superior returns.  The costs of active management are high as the industry convention is 
that funds managers should be remunerated by a percentage fee of the value of assets 
under management whereas an incentive scheme would be a flat fee with a bonus for out-
performance of the benchmark. 
 
Trustees specify the investment objectives of the superannuation in term which are easily 
obtainable.  Common specifications are to obtain a rate of return equivalent to three 
percentage points above inflation.  Alternative specifications of the investment objective 
are in terms of a comparative return; for instance, to obtain a return consistent with other 
similar funds or to obtain a return equivalent to the second quartile of similar funds.  
These specifications, while self-serving, are not suitable for superannuation funds 
adopting active asset selection techniques; for such funds the appropriate investment 
objective is out-performance of benchmark indexes. 
 
Specifications of the investment objective are in terms of a comparative return encourage 
‘herding’ on the part of funds managers as the goal of individual funds managers is not to 
obtain returns specified in absolute terms but in terms of their competitors; this will help 
ensure that fund managers maintain their mandate. 
 
The major moral hazard problem in the current system is that trustees are likely to persist 
with under performing funds managers.  What mechanisms are available to ensure that an 
actively managed fund once selected continues to maintain its performance.  Harless and 
Peterson (1998) find that poor performance by US mutual funds can persist for sustained 
periods.  Trustees may be loath to do displace funds managers because this reflects 
unfavourably on their initial choice.  Goetzmann and Peles (1994) argue that US mutual 






Given the extent of the problems in the principal and agent problems we would 
hypothesise that the fewer the constraints on the agent’s behaviour the superannuation 
fund will produce lower returns and higher costs; the potential residual loss for principals 
is unbounded; in retail funds investment decisions will not be taken at arms length; and 
generally, the scope for mismanagement and fraud is substantial.  
 
5. Performance of Superannuation Funds 
 
A recent study by Coleman, Esho and Wong (2003) provides comprehensive evidence for 
the first time on the performance of superannuation funds.  Using APRA annual data for 
the 1996 to 2002, the study found that significant differences in outcomes occur across 
the different type of funds; in particular, the findings were that: 
1.  Returns are highest for corporate funds and lowest for retail funds; 
2.  High expense funds have low gross and net returns; 
3.  Retail and industry funds have the lowest returns and volatility and the highest 
expenses; 
4.  Many funds, particularly retail funds, have failed to outperform the return available 
from a risk free investment in Treasury notes; 
5.  There is evidence of a negative return between returns and expenses suggesting that 
fund members receive little advantage from investing in superannuation funds with 
high expenses; 
6.  Retail funds exhibit potential problems with low returns and high fees indicating the 
potential for agency risk, i.e., trustees not acting appropriately in members’ interests; 
and, 
7.  Some 74 per cent of members belong to funds with expenses greater than 1 per cent 
(100 basis points) per annum
8. 
 
These findings are consistent with our hypotheses and with previous partial studies of 
performance.  They provide confirmatory evidence to the previous work of Drew and 
Noland (2000), Drew and Stanford (2001a, 2001b, 2003), and Drew, Stanford and 
Veeraraghavan (2002) that there are substantial performance risks in Australian 
superannuation funds. 
 
6. Resolution of Principal and Agent Problems 
 
We have argued that the principal agent problem is complete.  Principals, the members of 
superannuation funds, are unable to select their agent, are unable construct the contract 
under which the agent operates and are unable to replace the agent for inferior 
performance.  Members of superannuation funds experience adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems and find that their superannuation fund produces a low return, high cost 
and inefficient result. 
                                                 
8 Pozen (2002) reports that in the USA, the Federal Thrift plan, a retirement vehicle for most Federal 
employees, offers a small number of broadly diversified stock and index plans, (investment choice in 
Australian terminology), with an annual expense ratio of seven basis points (or .07 per cent).  Allowing 
for the fact that some expenses may be absorbed by the employer, Rosen estimates that the full costs of 






Our preferred solution to the principal-agent problem is to allow employee choice of fund 
as recommended by the Wallis Committee (1997).  The Wallis Committee recommended 
that employees should be provided with choice of fund, subject to any constraints 
necessary to address concerns about administrative costs and fund liquidity.  The basic 
recommendation was that where superannuation fund benefits vest in a member, that 
member should have the right to transfer the amounts to any complying fund.  Where a 
member chooses to exercise that right, payments should be transferred to the chosen fund 
as soon as practicable, subject to controls necessary to maintain orderly management for 
the benefit of the fund.  The analysis of Drew and Stanford (2002) supports the Wallis 
recommendations and portability of accumulated balances, but considers administrative 
and transitional costs of a change of regime are likely to be low. 
 
This solution would allow employees to select their own agent to nominate and monitor 
the fund for their contributions; they have the ultimate sanction of withdrawing and 
transferring their balances.  This creates the incentive for trustees to be responsive to 
members’ wishes and to be more accountable for their decisions.  The Commonwealth 
government is considering introducing new requirements for trustees, e.g., licensing, but 
we argue that competition and market discipline, now absent, would better safeguard 
members’ superannuation entitlements.  Our views on this are sharpened by the report on 
the quality of financial planning advice, ASIC (2003), which found that, in general 
principal and agent problems were severe, and, in particular, that 14 per cent of financial 
plans examined did not meet legal requirements, higher fee investments were 
recommended without showing the basis of the recommendation, plans recommended the 
sale of existing assets without showing why the new investments would be better. 
 
The assertion that employees are unable to obtain the knowledge to make a rational 
choice of fund appears to spring from self interest by industry lobbyists and violates the 
presumption of consumer sovereignty and any welfare propositions about a regime 




We asked in the introduction to this paper how members of superannuation funds could 
take action to safeguard their superannuation entitlements.  Our analysis of principal and 
agent relations showed that there is nothing members can do.  The current structure of 
superannuation funds leads to poor corporate governance; poor investment decisions by 
trustees; lack of disclosure by trustees to members; absence of arms length investments 
by trustees; failure to address member complaints; poor consumer protection for 
members; inadequate prudential regulation of superannuation funds; lack of competition 
in the superannuation industry; and a lack of market discipline on superannuation funds.  
The possibility of potential loss through mismangement and fraud is there although we 
have no way of assessing how probable a large scale loss is.  Even if we assume away 
such a possibility, we know that small rates of underperformance by superannuation 





recommendation to solve the principal-agent problems is for unrestricted member choice 
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